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WHAT REMAINS OF FEDERAL AFDC STANDARDS AFTER
JEFFERSON v. HACKNEY?
The Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC)' pro-
gram of the Social Security Act of 1935 (Federal Act)2 was originally
enacted to encourage the states to provide financial assistance to needy
children. Since that time additional programs have been added to provide
medical aid,3 employment training,4 and other social services.' How-
ever, before receiving these other benefits, a family must first qualify for
monthly cash assistance under the AFDC program.' The reliance of the
poor on these services makes it essential that any state or federal action
that deprives them of these benefits is carefully studied to insure that such
action complies with all existing federal standards and statutes.
Many states have been unwilling or unable to provide adequate as-
sistance to all needy children.7 To apportion available funds the states
have resorted to two different techniques. The first is to reduce the num-
ber of eligible recipients; the other is to reduce the amount of assistance
disbursed to eligible children or families. The former method denies some
children all cash assistance and contingent services, whereas the latter only
reduces the cash benefits without affecting services.
Initially states exercised almost unlimited discretion in distributing
AFDC funds. Over the years, however, Congress and the Supreme Court
have limited this discretion by forcing the states to provide aid for all
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-44 (1970).
2. Id. §§ 301-1396.
3. Id. §§ 1396-96g (medicaid program).
4. Id. § 602(a) (19).
5. Id. NR 602(a) (13)-(14). Each state determines what services it will make
available to AFDC recipients. The purpose of these services it to "maintain and
strengthen family life for children." Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (1970) (medicaid) ; id. § 602(a) (19) (employment
training) ; id. § 602(a) (14) (social services). Medicaid also allows the states to
provide medical assistance to persons not receiving cash assistance; however, this provi-
sion is optional with the states. Id. § 1396a (a) (10) (B).
7. In 1970 the average number of children and adults receiving monthly AFDC
payments was 7.4 million. This figure represented an increase of 75.3 per cent over
the 1965 figure. Expenditures for assistance payments rose from 1.6 billion dollars
in 1965 to 4.1 billion dollars in 1970. NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, DEPT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, NCSS REPORT H-4, TRENDS xi AFDC 1965-
1970, at 1 (1970). This phenomenal increase has made it difficult for many states
to adequately plan and allocate resources for welfare assistance. In some states the
problem has been compounded by statutory or constitutional ceilings on annual amounts
that can be appropriated for public welfare expenditures. See, e.g., TEx. Co-ST. art.
3, § 51-a(4), which imposes an eighty million dollar ceiling on public welfare expendi-
tures.
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children eligible for AFDC under the Federal Act, without preventing the
states from limiting the amount of assistance each child receives. In
Jefferson v. Hackney,s the Supreme Court for the first time appears to
have permitted a state to implement procedures which deny AFDC bene-
fits to needy families which otherwise qualify for such benefits under the
Federal Act. In a narrowly written opinion, the Court left unclear the
true import of its decision. Resolution of the potential conflict between
iefferson and earlier cases is essential to further meaningful litigation
concerning AFDC.
AFDC: THE STATUTE AND PREVIOUS LITIGATION
AFDC is one of the four categorical assistance programs established
by the Federal Act. Participation in AFDC is voluntary for the states.
Financing is provided primarily by the federal government on a matching
fund basis, but the program is administered almost exclusively by the
states.'" To take advantage of AFDC a state must submit its plan for ap-
proval by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. 1 All sub-
sequent changes must also be approved.'2
The AFDC program singles out for assistance the needy dependent
child. 8 It makes eligible all needy children who have been denied
parental care and support and who meet certain age and educational re-
quirements.' 4 The determination of which children are needy and how
much they are to be paid is left to the discretion of the states."
The cornerstone of all state programs is the standard of need. This
is the dollar amount considered essential for the subsistence of the family
in question and thus is the yardstick for measuring who is needy and how
8. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 301-1396 (1970). In addition to the AFDC program, id. H8
601-44, there are programs for Old Age Assistance, id. §§ 301-429, Aid to the Blind,
id. §§ 1201-06, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, id. § 1351-55.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970).
11. Id. § 601 (1970). Such plans must conform to the requirements of 42 U.S.C.
§602 (1970) and 45 C.F.R. Pt. 233 (1972).
12. 45 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1972).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
14. The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1) who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence
from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living
with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather,
stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece,
in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his
or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B)
under the age of twenty-one and . . . a student regularly attending a
school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or
technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment.
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
15. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1970).
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much assistance they should receive." In this formula, each state makes
its own determination of what items are essential.' 7
States have attempted to limit AFDC expenditures in two ways.
First, they have tried to restrict eligibility. Waiting lists were an early
example of this." Section 602(a) (10) of the AFDC program 9 was
passed to prohibit the use of waiting lists by providing that all eligible
persons are to receive some assistance with "reasonable promptness."2
Another device used by the states to limit the number of welfare recipients
was the "suitable home" requirement.2 After 25 years of use, the effect
of this requirement was diminished by Congressional action in 1961 and
1962; these amendments allow states to remove a child from a judicially
determined unsuitable home,22 but prohibit termination of AFDC bene-
fits unless other adequate care and assistance is provided.23
More recently, in King v. Snith, 4 involving a challenge to
Alabama's "substitute father" rule,25 the Supreme Court determined that
states may not impose eligibility requirements not recognized by the
AFDC program. The Court found that, in the absence of voluntary con-
tributions or a legal duty to support on the part of the "substitute father,"
the state may not deny assistance to any needy child.26
16. Id.
17. Id. Standards of need for a family of four vary from 132 dollars in Puerto
Rico to 400 dollars in Alaska. NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL STATISTICS, DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,, NCSS REPORT D-2, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS: STANDARDS FOR BAsic NEEDS, JULY, 1971, at 16, table 6 (1972).
18. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 493-94 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
These lists contained the names of applicants who could not draw any assistance until
state appropriations were increased or persons receiving assistance were dropped from
the welfare rolls.
19. [A111 individuals wishing to make application for aid to families with
dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to families with
dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible
individuals.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1970).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1970).
21. W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 20 (1965). Under such requirements,
the caseworker had to determine that a child's home was suitable in order for the
child to be eligible for assistance. Frequently, the suitableness of a home was based
on the moral conduct of the mother. Id. at 20-39. The federal government began to
discourage these types of requirements in 1945. Id. at 40.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 609(a) (1) (1970).
23. Id. § 604(b). Assistance may not be denied to any eligible child to discourage
illegitimate births or to regulate the inother's moral conduct. King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 324 (1969).
24. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
25. This rule provided that the income of any man who "cohabited" with a needy
child's mother was to be included in the child's resources for purposes of determining
need. 392 U.S. at 311.
26. 392 U.S. at 329-30. In Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970), the Court
relied on King in holding that, in the absence of voluntary contributions, the income of
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In Townsend v. Swank," the Supreme Court indicated when a state
may exercise discretion in determining AFDC eligibility. Illinois denied
assistance to children aged eighteen to twenty who attended college, but
provided assistance to children in the same age group who attended voca-
tional or technical training schools.28 In holding that the Illinois provi-
sion violated § 606(a) of AFDC, 9 the Court stated that in the absence
of express authority in either the AFDC provisions or their legislative
history, states may not deny assistance to any person eligible for benefits
under the federal standards."0 The Court went on to point out that a
state which adopts an eligibility standard that excludes such persons
violates the Supremacy Clause and any such standard is therefore in-
valid."'
The second way that states have sought to contain their welfare ex-
penditures is by limiting the amounts paid to each eligible recipient. Two
separate methods have been used to implement these limitations and both
have gained the approval of the Supreme Court. One method is the
ratable reduction, which permits the states to pay each recipient only a
fixed percentage of his standard of need." The Supreme Court in Rosado
stepfathers, or any other male living in the house, may not be considered in determining
a child's need.
27. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
28. The Illinois statute provided in part:
Child Age Eligibility. The Child or Children must be under age 18, or
age 18 or over but under age 21 if in regular attendance in high school or in
a vocational or technical training school.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
29. See note 14 supra.
30. 404 U.S. at 286.
31. Id. Although the majority phrased its holding in terms of the Supremacy
Clause, it used language which indicates that Townsend only supports the proposition
that Congress can control the way in which states spend federal funds:
Congress meant to continue financial assistance for AFDC programs for the
age group only in States that conformed their eligibility requirements to the
federal eligibility standards.
Id. at 287.
Further support for this interpretation of Townsend is found in the concurring
opinion of Chief Justice Burger:
The appropriate inquiry in any case should be, simply, whether the State
has indeed adhered to the provisions and is accordingly entitled to utilize
federal funds in support of its program.
Id. at 292.
32. Using this method, each family eligible for AFDC has its standard of need
reduced by multiplying the standard by a certain percentage. For example, a family
with a 200 dollar standard of need in a state using a fifty per cent reduction factor
would receive benefits of 100 dollars. The reduction factors currently used vary from
35 per cent in Alabama to ninety per cent in New York. NATIONAL CENTER FOR SOCIAL
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, NCSS REPORT D-3, STATE
:MAXIMUMS AND OTHER METHODS OF LIMITING MONEY PAYMENTS TO RECIPIENTS OF
THE SPECIAL TYPES OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, JULY, 1971, at 7, table 3 (1972).
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v. Wyman33 held that this was a valid procedure because it is not an eli-
gibility limitation but rather a proper exercise of the state's discretion to
set benefit levels.3" For the same reasons, the maximum grant" was ap-
proved in Dandridge v. Williams8 as a second method of budgeting
AFDC funds."
Congressional disapproval of the "waiting list" and "suitable home"
requirements in conjunction with the Court's decisions in King and
Townsend show that a state's discretionary power is severely limited by
the Federal Act when making eligibility judgments other than establish-
ing a standard of need."8 On the other hand, Rosado and Dandridge are
examples of when states may exercise their discretionary powers. Of
course, the divergence between the valid and invalid procedures might
also be explained by the fact that the limitations on eligibility were some-
what onerous because they involved moral or discretionary judgments89
whereas the regulations in Rosado and Dandridge were capable of objec-
tive determination.
JEFFERSON V. HACKNEY
Jefferson v. Hackney" upheld the Texas method of applying income
in determining AFDC eligibilty and benefit levels. Texas uses a ratable
reduction system similar to the scheme approved in Rosado. However,
rather than subtract income before applying the reduction factor, Texas
33. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
34. Id. at 409. The Court in Rosado appears to have based its decision on the
assumption that any earned income was subtracted from the standard of need before the
reduction factor was applied. Id. at 409 n.13.
When discussing the ratable reduction the Court only considered whether it was
permissible for the states to pay less than the full standard of need. It did not deter-
mine whether the ratable reduction could be used to deny assistance to persons whose
income was less than their standard of need. Thus, the Court's decision regarding the
ratable reduction is concerned with the states' power to limit assistance rather than
with the states' ability to limit eligibility for assistance. This reading of the Court's
treatment of the ratable reduction is supported by the fact that the Court separately
discussed state action which reduced the number of families eligible for AFDC. Id. at
415-23.
35. The maximum grant imposes a ceiling on AFDC payments which applies
regardless of a family's need. Although the ceiling may vary with the size of the
family, the maximum grant tends to impose greater hardship on large families. Dand-
ridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 474-77 (1970).
36. 397U.S. 471 (1970).
37. Id. at 481.
38. In 1967, Congress amended the Social Security Act to force the states to
make cost of living increases in their standards of need. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23)
(1970). In Rosado, the Court said that this amendment could not be interpreted to
mean that the states can lower their standards of need. 397 U.S. at 417.
39. Ing;v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320 (1968).
40. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
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applies the factor first and then subtracts the income.4 This permits
Texas not only to limit the amount of aid each person receives, but also
to deny benefits to families whose income is less than their standard of
need.42 Thus, applying an eligibility/benefit level distinction, the Texas
method appears invalid because it restricts eligibility, yet valid because it
only limits benefit levels. Jefferson is the first case to pose this dilemma.
Unfortunately, the Court did not fully address the eligibility question"
and thus the dilemma is left unresolved.
One analysis which eliminates this dilemma is the argument that
41. To illustrate, it will be assumed that a family with a 200 dollar standard of
need has earned income of fifty dollars, and that the applicable reduction factor is fifty
per cent. Under the Texas system, the family would receive only fifty dollars in
benefits, whereas it would receive 75 dollars in benefits under a system in which
earned income was subtracted from the standard of need before applying the reduction
factor:
Texas Method Alternate Method
Standard of need $200 Standard of need $200
X Reduction factor .50 -Earned income 50
Reduced need $100 Unmet need $150
-Earned income 50 X Reduction factor .50
Benefits paid $ 50 Benefits paid $ 75
42. If, in the hypothetical set forth in note 41 supra, the family had earned
income of 100 dollars, the Texas system would have afforded no benefits at all. On
the other hand, if a system was used in wlhich earned income was subtracted from the
standard of need before applying the reduction factor, the family would have received
fifty dollars in benefits.
43. 406 U.S. at 539-45. The eligibility question presented by appellants was
whether § 602(a)(23) of the AFDC program as interpreted in Rosado mandated
increased eligibility for AFDC. The Court answered this question in the negative, and
did not speculate on the broader question of whether it is permissible to deny assistance
to families whose income is less than their standard of need if they otherwise qualify
for assistance under the federal standards. The Court did say that § 602 (a)(10)
was limited in its scope and cannot be invoked for this purpose. However, no other
provision of the AFDC program was raised by appellants or the Court. Thus, it
appears that the broader question will only be answered in later litigation of each
statutory provision.
One factor which might account for the Court's failure to fully consider eligibility,
thereby deviating from prior cases, is the Texas constitutional limitation on welfare
expenditures:
The Legislature shall have authority to enact appropriate legislation
which will enable the State of Texas to cooperate with the Government of
the United States in providing assistance to and/or medical care on behalf of
needy persons ...... : provided that the total amount of such assistance
payments only out of state funds on behalf of such individuals shall not exceed
the amount of Eighty Million Dollars ($80,000,000) during any fiscal year.
TExx. CoNST. art. 3, § 51-a(4). Faced with this restriction the Court may have been
unwilling to force Texas to change its method and thereby raise expenditures above the
constitutional ceiling. However, this problem does not seem substantial because the
state can always lower its reduction factor to contain costs. Moreover, the history
of the constitutional provision shows that each time Texas was faced with a crisis
in welfare funds, the ceiling was increased by constitutional amendment. See TEx.
CONST. ANz. art. 3, § 51-a, Comment (Suplf. 1971).
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Jefferson overruled King and Townsend and granted the states almost
unlimited discretion to determine AFDC eligibility. However, in Carle-
son v. Remnillard,4" which was decided just one week after Jefferson, the
Supreme Court struck down a California provision which denied as-
sistance to so-called "military orphans." 5 In doing so, the Court relied
heavily on both King and Townsend in holding that states may not impose
conditions on AFDC eligibility not recognized by the Federal Act.46
Although not overruling earlier cases, Jefferson seems to eliminate
the possibility that reducing the size of the welfare rolls and denying other-
wise eligible persons assistance is a relevant factor in determining the
validity of a procedure. This is best illustrated by the fact that Texas
increased its standard of need by 11 per cent, yet by simultaneously adopt-
ing its new procedure removed 2,470 families from the welfare rolls."
Also, Carleson makes clear that the basis for determining the validity of
state procedures is not whether the regulation involves an objective judg-
ment, rather than a discretionary or moralistic one. The "military
orphan" condition is well suited to an objective determination 8 and yet
the regulation was struck down.
Both the Federal Act and the cases can only be reconciled if need is
the factor used to determine what actions by the states are valid. The
waiting list, the suitable home, the substitute father, the Illinois educa-
tion restriction, and the military orphan are all impermissible eligibility
conditions based on something other than need. In contrast, the ratable
reduction, the maximum payment, and the Texas method all accomplish
their goal by imposing limitations related to the standard of need. Thus,
states may exercise very broad discretion in making eligibility determina-
tions related to standard of need, but may not regulate any other facet of
AFDC eligibility unless the Federal Act or its legislative history
specifically permits it.
49
44. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
45. A "military orphan" is a child whose father is in the military service and away
from home on active duty. 406 U.S. at 599.
46. 406 U.S. at 601.
47. Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
48. Calif. Dept. Soc. Welfare Reg. EAS 42-350.11 provides that "continued
absence" does not exist:
When one parent is physically absent from the home on a
temporary basis. Examples are visits, trips made in connection
with current or prospective employment, active duty in the Armed
Services.
406 U.S. at 599 n.1.
49. The only current exception to this broad conclusion is the prohibition imposed
by the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act and Rosado against lowering the
standard of need. See note 38 supra. However, since there is no limitation on the
reduction factor and the Texas method of ratable reduction was approved in Jefferson,
287
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INCOME DISREGARD: OVERCOMING JEFFERSON
One major effect of the Jefferson decision is that approximately
2,500 Texas families were dropped from the welfare rolls.5" This means
they suffered a reduction in disposable income and an increase in living
costs due to the loss of the contingent services."' The Supreme Court did
not foreclose the possibility that provisions of AFDC statutes not in
dispute in Jefferson might be used to invalidate Texas' procedures and
restore welfare benefits to these families. The income disregard52 is well-
suited for this purpose.
In Jefferson, the issue presented was whether § 602 (a) (23) of the
AFDC program 3 prohibited use of Texas' procedure." No other statu-
tory provision was litigated. In their brief the appellants used other
statutory provisions, including the income disregard, to support their
argument as to the intent of Congress in passing § 602 (a) (23), but they
did not directly invoke these other statutes. Moreover, the Court recog-
nized the very limited question it had before it. In particular, Justice
Rehnquist stated that the case involved no dispute over whether or not
Texas' procedures complied with the income disregard." Thus, that
question is still open.
Section 602(a) (8),"' the income disregard, was part of the 1967
Amendments "7 to the Federal Act. An overriding goal of Congress in
adopting these amendments was to provide work incentives without en-
the states may in effect reduce the standard of need to whatever level they desire.
See notes 41 & 42 supra.
50. Jefferson v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
51. See note 6 supra & text accompanying.
52. The income disregard provides for the exemption of specified amounts of
earned income from the computation of AFDC payment levels. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8)
(1970).
53. [B]y July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs
of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs
since such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State imposes
on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23) (1970).
54. Jefferson was initially instituted to challenge the validity of ratable reduc-
tions, and the district court found that § 602(a) (23) prohibited their use. Jefferson
v. Hackney, 304 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1969). An appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court, but before the case was heard, the original decision was vacated and the case
remanded for further proceedings consistent with Rosado. Jefferson v. Hackney,
397 U.S. 821 (1970). On remand the district court entered judgment against the
plaintiffs, who, in a motion to amend the judgment, first raised the issue of whether the
Texas procedure in particular complied with § 602(a) (23) as interpreted by Rosado.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (23) (1970).
55. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 544 (1972).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (1970).
57. Social Security Amendments of 1967, 81 Stat. 821 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
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larging the welfare rolls.18  Although many of these amendments en-
countered strong Congressional opposition, income disregard met with
substantial approval in both Houses.
The major provision of the disregard excludes the first thirty
dollars from a person's total monthly earned income and also eliminates
one-third of the remainder of such income. 9 This provision is designed
to help the needy become self-supparting and eventually lower the welfare
burden."0 The primary advantage of this method to the welfare recipient
is that it lowers the family's aid by less than one dollar for each dollar
earned."'
An eligibility test was designed to prevent the income disregard
from expanding the welfare rolls."2 If a family's gross income is less than
its standard of need, it is eligible to use the disregard.63 Even though
a family cannot meet this criterion, it can still qualify for the disregard
if, during any one of the previous four months, part or all of that family's
58. The House Committee on Ways and Means stated:
The bill contains provisions which will prevent increasing the number of
persons receiving assistance as a result of the earnings exemption. The pro-
visions discussed above are to become available only with respect to persons
whose income was not in excess of their needs as determined by the State
agency without the application of this provision for the disregarding of income.
That is only if a family's total income falls below the standard of need will
the earnings exemption be available.
H.R. RP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967). For a nearly identical statement
by the Senate Committee on Finance, see S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 158
(1967).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (A) (ii) (1970). The Senate Finance Committee
recommended that the first fifty dollars be excluded from a person's monthly earned
income, and that one-half of the resulting figure also be excluded. S. REP. No. 744,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1967). However, the figures were reduced to thirty dollars
and one-third by the Conference Committee to correspond to the House recommen-
dations. CorF. REa'. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
In addition to the basic thirty dollar exclusion, the states may exclude five dollars
from a person's monthly earned income. Furthermore, the income disregard provides
for excluding all income of each child who is a full-time student or a part-time student
without a full-time job, and amounts can be set aside to cover the future identifiable
needs of a child. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (A) (i) & (B) (i)-(ii) (1970).
If an otherwise eligible AFDC recipient refuses a bona fide offer of employment
or reduces or terminates his income without good cause, he may not take advantage
of the disregard provisions. Id. § 602 (a) (8) (C).
60. H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1967); S. REP. No. 744, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1967).
61. S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-8 (1967). Prior to the enactment
of the income disregard all earned income of parents or other relatives of AFDC
children reduced assistance dollar for dollar. Id.
62. Supra note 58.
63. [No income shall be disregarded] if with respect to such month the
income of the persons so specified (within the meaning of clause (7)) was
in excess of their need as determined by the State agency.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (D) (1970).
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need was met by an assistance payment. " Unless the family meets one
of these two criteria, it may not use the income disregard.
The intent and mechanics of the income disregard cannot be re-
conciled with the procedures approved in Jefferson. The problem is posed
by the family whose income is less than its standard of need and therefore
eligible for the income disregard, but which is not eligible to receive any
assistance because its nonexcluded income exceeds its ratably reduced
standard of need. 5 Thus a class of needy persons which the income dis-
regard was designed to assist in becoming self-supporting is denied any
practical benefit from it.
From a practical standpoint, the Texas method also seems incon-
sistent with the second eligibility provision, whose purpose was to allow
income to rise above the standard of need without imperiling AFDC eli-
gibility.6 6 Depending upon the reduction factor used by a state, the Texas
method would compel termination of assistance before a family's income
even reached its standard of need.17 Therefore, the Congressional purpose
64. [No income shall be disregarded], unless, for any one of the four
months preceding such month, the needs of such persons were met by the
furnishing of aid under the plan.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (D) (1970). Thus, even though a family with a 200 dollar
standard of need has income of 210 dollars for the current month, it is eligible to
use the income disregard if it has received some cash assistance in any one of the four
preceding months. Since only nonexcluded income is used to determine payment
levels, this means the family may still be eligible for AFDC. See notes 65 & 73
infra.
The provision can result in inequities. If two families have the same income, one
might be eligible for AFDC because it had received some assistance in the previous
four months while the other could not draw any aid because its income had never
dropped below its standard of need. The Congressional committees studying the
provision recognized this possibility but felt that the cost savings generated by the
provision outweighed any harm that might result. They stated that welfare costs
would be increased by "about $160 million a year by placing people on the AFDC
rolls who now have earnings in excess of their need for public assistance as deter-
mined under their State plan." S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1967).
Despite the provision's inequity, it was upheld as constitutional in Conner v. Finch,
314 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Conner v. Richardson, 400 U.S.
1003 (1971).
65. Assume a family with a 200 dollar standard of need and earned income of
180 dollars in a state using the Texas method and a fifty per cent reduction factor.
Since the family's income is less than its standard of need, it is eligible to use the
income disregard. However, the family would not receive any benefits.
Disregard Calculations Payment Calculations
Earned income $180 Standard of need $200
-Fixed amount 30 XReduction factor .50
$150 Reduced need $100
-($150 x 1/3) 50 -Nonexcluded income 100
Nonexcluded income $100 Benefits paid 0
66. See notes 58 & 64 supra.
67. See note 65 supra.
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underlying the one-in-four provision would be frustrated.
In X v. McCorkle"8 the district court, in striking down a New Jersey
AFDC regulation because it conflicted with § 602 (a) (8), held that the
income disregard "statute requires adherence to the formula it sets
forth." 0 The Solicitor General, speaking for the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, later argued this position when McCorkle was
appealled to the Supreme Court.7" Unfortunately, the Court did not
discuss the income disregard issue;71 however, the blanket affirmance of
the lower court on this issue72 suggests that states must strictly comply
with § 6 02(a) (8).
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that Congress would create a detailed system of work
incentives if it anticipated that those provisions would be rendered useless
by the states. In contrast to the Texas method, subtracting income before
applying the reduction factor enables the income disregard to work
exactly as Congress outlined it.73 Perhaps this argument can form the
68. 333 F. Supp. 1109 (D.N.J. 1970), aff'd sub norn. Engleman v. Amos, 404
U.S. 23 (1971). This case involved a New Jersey welfare regulation which established
administrative ceilings of about 133 per cent of the standard of need for the working
poor. 333 F. Supp. at 1111 n.4. Enumerated items were subtracted from gross income,
and if this adjusted income exceeded the administrative ceiling then the family received
no assistance; however, if the adjusted income was less than the administrative ceiling,
the benefit level was equal to the difference between the two. Id. The district court
found this scheme impermissible because it failed to comply with the income disregard.
Id. at 1116-17.
69. 333 F. Supp. at 1117.
70. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Engleman v. Amos, 404
U.S. 23 (1971). In Amos, the Solicitor General also argued that the New Jersey
income disregard regulation was invalid because it denied assistance to some other-
wise eligible persons. Id. at 11.
71. Engleman v. Amos, 404 U.S. 23 (1971).
72. Id. at 24.
73. Assume a family with a 200 dollar standard of need and earned income of
180 dollars in a state using this method and a fifty per cent reduction factor. Since
the family's income is less than its standard of need, it is eligible to use the income
disregard.
Disregard Calculations Payment Calculations
Earned income $180 Standard of need $200
-Fixed amount 30 -Nonexcluded income 100
$150 Unmet need $100
-($150 x 1/3) 50 XReduction factor .50
Nonexcluded income $100 Benefits paid $ 50
Now assume that the family earns 180 dollars in months 1 through 4 and 210
dollars in month 5. Even though the family's income in month 5 exceeds its standard
of need, it is eligible to use the disregard because its income for the first four months
was less than its standard of need.
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basis of another legal attack on the Texas system. 4 In any future case of
this type, the Court will hopefully clarify the discretion allowed states
when implementing procedures which affect AFDC eligibility.
MICHAEL E. ARME"
Disregard Calculations Payment Calculations
Earned income $210 Standard of need $200
-Fixed amount 30 -Nonexcluded income 120
$180 Unmet need $ 80
-($180 x 1/3) 60 )Reduction factor .50
Nonexcluded income $120 Benefits paid $ 40
Thus, even though the family's income rises above its standard of need, it still receives
assistance and also remains eligible for the contingent services.
74. Basically the same type of argument can be made in cases involving the
statutory provisions which provide for services that are contingent upon the standard
of need or receipt of cash assistance. The appellants in Jefferson cited the purpose
of these provisions to support their argument that § 602(a) (23) prohibited the use
of the Texas method. As with the income disregard, the Court did not foreclose
this line of argument.
